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This paper reviews alternative options for monetary policy when the short-term interest rate is at the
zero lower bound and develops new empirical estimates of the effects of the maturity structure of publicly
held debt on the term structure of interest rates.  We use a model of risk-averse arbitrageurs to develop
measures of how the maturity structure of debt held by the public might affect the pricing of level,
slope and curvature term-structure risk.  We find these Treasury factors historically were quite helpful
for predicting both yields and excess returns over 1990-2007.  The historical correlations are consistent
with the claim that if in December of 2006, the Fed were to have sold off all its Treasury holdings
of less than one-year maturity (about $400 billion) and use the proceeds to retire Treasury debt from
the long end, this might have resulted in a 14-basis-point drop in the 10-year rate and an 11-basis-point
increase in the 6-month rate.  We also develop a description of how the dynamic behavior of the term
structure of interest rates changed after hitting the zero lower bound in 2009.  Our estimates imply
that at the zero lower bound, such a maturity swap would have the same effects as buying $400 billion
in long-term maturities outright with newly created reserves, and could reduce the 10-year rate by
13 basis points without raising short-term yields.
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The key instrument of monetary policy is the interest rate on overnight loans between banks,
which in normal times is quite sensitive to the quantity of excess reserves. However, since
December 2008, the Fed's target for the fed funds rate has been essentially zero. The level
of reserves, which had typically been around $10 billion prior to the nancial crisis, has been
maintained in the neighborhood of a trillion dollars. Trying to lower the short-term interest
rate or increase the volume of reserves any further oers little promise of boosting aggregate
demand. With the Fed's traditional tools incapable of providing further stimulus to the
economy, it is of considerable interest to ask what other options might be available to the
central bank.
Our study begins by briey reviewing some of the available options and the Fed's experience
with using them. That analysis leads us to focus on one strategy in particular, which is to try
to inuence the term structure of interest rates through the maturity structure of securities
acquired by open-market purchases.
A number of previous studies have reported evidence that the relative supplies of Treasury
securities of dierent maturities are correlated with yield spreads; see for example Roley
(1982), Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004), Kuttner (2006), Gagnon, Raskin, Remache,
and Sack (2010), Doh (2010), Greenwood and Vayanos (2010), D'Amico and King (2010), and
Swanson (2011).1 But using those correlations to infer potential eects of nonstandard open-
market operations raises questions from the perspective of both economic theory, in terms of
1Other closely related research includes Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010), Baumeister and
Benati (2010), Kitchen and Chinn (2010), and Hancock and Passmore (2011).
3the proposed mechanism whereby the eects could possibly be generated, as well as from the
perspective of econometric methodology, in terms of whether it is reasonable to place a causal
interpretation on the correlations. Our paper makes contributions in both areas.
Our theoretical motivation follows Vayanos and Vila (2009), who developed a promising
framework for understanding how the supplies of assets of dierent maturities might inuence
their respective yields. Vayanos and Vila postulate the existence of two groups of investors.
The willingness of preferred-habitat investors to buy securities of maturity n is presumed to
be an increasing function of the yield on that asset. A second group, known as arbitrageurs,
is willing to hold any assets based on a simple tradeo between expected return and risk. The
behavior of the second group generates no-arbitrage conditions relating the yields on dierent
securities. We show that bond yields in this framework must be consistent with the rst-order
conditions for portfolio optimization by the arbitrageurs, and use these as the basis for our
empirical analysis.
Our empirical analysis follows Doh (2010) and Greenwood and Vayanos (2010) in using
the Vayanos and Vila (2009) framework to try to quantify the ability of nonstandard open-
market operations to change the yields on assets of dierent maturities. We dier from
these earlier researchers in making more use of the details of the framework to inform the
empirical estimates, developing a discrete-time version of the model and relating it directly
to maximum-likelihood estimates of the dynamic behavior of the term structure of interest
rates. We develop specic historical measures of how the maturity structure of debt issued to
the public might be expected to aect the pricing of level, slope, and curvature risk according
to this framework, and show that our inferred Treasury risk factors were historically quite
4helpful in predicting yields and excess returns. For example, we nd that over 1990-2007, the
excess one-year return from holding 2-year Treasuries over 1-year Treasuries can be predicted
with an R2 of 71% on the basis of traditional term-structure factors along with our proposed
Treasury risk factors.
One of the challenges for estimating potential policy eects on the basis of historical
correlations is the problem of endogeneity, in that the correlation between bond supplies and
interest rates may reect the response of the Treasury or the Fed to interest rates. We
try to minimize this endogeneity bias by looking at forecasting rather than contemporaneous
regressions and including the current level, slope, and curvature as additional explanatory
variables in the regression. Our impact estimates are based on the incremental contribution
of the Treasury maturity structure to a one-month-ahead forecast of interest rates beyond the
information already contained in the current term structure, so that insofar as the maturities of
debt issued by the Treasury or purchased by the Fed are responding to current interest rates,
that response could not account for our estimated eects. Our dynamic formulation also
avoids the potential spurious regression problem that could arise in simple contemporaneous
regressions that make no allowance for near-unit-root dynamics.
We use our estimated forecasting relations to analyze the outcome of the following policy
change. Suppose the Federal Reserve were to sell o all of its holdings of Treasury securities of
less than one-year duration, and use the proceeds to buy up all the outstanding Treasury debt
it could at the long end of the yield curve. For example, in 2006 this would have involved
a $400 billion asset swap that would have retired all Treasury debt of more than 10-years
duration. Our estimates imply that, in an environment not aected by the zero lower bound,
5this would have decreased the 10-year yield by 14 basis points and increased the 6-month yield
by 11 basis points.
We next develop a framework for analyzing the behavior of interest rates when the short-
term interest rate hits the zero lower bound. Our basic approach is to postulate that move-
ments in longer-term yields in such a setting are explained by arbitrageurs' assumption that
the economy will eventually break out of the zero lower bound, and that, once it does, short-
term interest rates would again uctuate in response to the same kind of forces as they did
historically. We propose a very parsimonious description in which arbitrageurs assume that,
apart from a possible downward shift in the average level, the post-ZLB dynamics will be the
same as those observed in the pre-ZLB experience. Given an exogenous probability of exiting
the ZLB in any given period, we then develop a no-arbitrage theory of how the term structure
evolves dynamically when at the ZLB. We nd this model provides a reasonable empirical
description of the behavior of the term structure during 2009 and 2010.
We then use this model to revisit the question analyzed for the pre-2007 data. We nd
that, at the ZLB, an asset swap could continue to depress long-term yields by the same amount
that it would in normal times, without producing any rise in short-term yields. Thus, whereas
swapping short-term for long-term assets has no consequences for the overall level of interest
rates in normal times, it is an available tool for lowering the overall level at the ZLB. Moreover,
since at the ZLB newly created reserves are essentially equivalent to short-term T-bills, direct
large-scale asset purchases are a feasible tool that the Fed could use to lower long-term interest
rates when at the ZLB.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews alternative mechanisms whereby
6monetary policy might still be able to inuence interest rates for an economy at the ZLB, and
explains our reason for focusing in particular on the possible eects arising through changes
in the maturity composition of outstanding debt. Section 3 develops a discrete-time version
of the Vayanos and Vila (2009) framework for analyzing the nature of preferred-habitat asset
markets and the pricing of term-structure risk. Section 4 provides details of our method for
obtaining maximum-likelihood estimates of parameters, while Section 5 reviews the data set
assembled for this study. In Section 6 we analyze the eects of nonstandard open-market
operations in an environment of uctuating short-term interest rates, while Section 7 extends
the analysis to an economy in which the short-term rate is temporarily stuck at some lower
bound. Section 8 compares our results with other recent estimates, discusses the implications
for non-Treasury yields, and looks at details of the particular policies implemented by the
Federal Reserve in November of 2010. Section 9 concludes.
2 Options for monetary stimulus at the zero lower bound.
When the short-term interest rate gets all the way to zero, an open-market purchase of a short-
term Treasury security with newly created base money represents an exchange of essentially
equivalent assets. Such an exchange is obviously incapable of lowering the short-term rate
any further, and it's not clear how the exchange could aect any economic magnitude of
interest. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) described this as a situation in which the demand
for money is completely satiated. With over a trillion dollars in excess reserves, the United
States presently appears to be well past the satiation point for Federal Reserve deposits.
7Even if the demand for reserve balances is presently satiated, as long as the situation
is not permanent, at some future date the Fed will regain its ability to inuence overnight
rates. Thus even at the zero lower bound, Krugman (1998) and Eggertsson and Woodford
(2003) proposed that the central bank could mitigate the current problems by successfully
communicating its commitment to reverse any decreases in the price level, embracing the
higher future ination rates necessary to achieve that. Although such a strategy holds appeal
in theory, in practice it appears to be quite hard to achieve. For example, the top panel of
Figure 1 plots the 5-year expected ination rate implied by the dierence between nominal
and ination-indexed U.S. Treasuries. This plunged in the fall of 2008, and has yet to recover
to its pre-crisis levels. Five-year expected ination has also declined according to the average
response to the Survey of Professional Forecasters (bottom panel). The failure of the Fed
to follow the theoretical policy prescription of trying to increase inationary expectations in
response to the crisis is not so much an indictment of the Fed as it is a clear demonstration
that these expectations are far more dicult to control in practice than simple theoretical
treatments might sometimes suppose.
If buying T-bills with newly created reserves has no eect, the Fed could buy some other
assets which clearly are not perfect substitutes for cash. One obvious class of assets to
consider purchasing would be those denominated in foreign currencies. If the Fed announced
a commitment to buy such assets without limit until the dollar depreciated, it is hard to
imagine real-world market forces that could prevent the goal from being achieved. In terms
of theoretical models, the ability of the Fed to make good on such a commitment could arise
from a portfolio balance eect (McCallum (2000)), or the announcement could serve as an
8expectations coordinating mechanism (Svensson (2001)). In either case, it certainly seems
one practical tool for preventing deation even if no others are available.
In the actual U.S. experience over 2008-2010, the Federal Reserve doubled the size of
its balance sheet, buying two broad classes of assets (see Figure 2). In the rst year of
the crisis, the Fed was aggressively extending loans through a variety of new facilities such
as the Term Auction Facility (essentially a term discount window open to all depository
institutions on an auction basis), foreign currency swaps (used to assist foreign central banks
in lending dollars), and the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (which helped provide loans
for issuers of commercial paper). These measures could matter both in terms of making these
markets more liquid (in the sense of reducing bid-ask spreads) as well as potentially absorbing
some default risk onto the Fed's balance sheet. Christensen, Lopez, and Rudebusch (2009),
McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang (2008), Taylor and Williams (2009), Adrian, Kimbrough,
and Marchioni (2010) and Duygan-Bump, Parkinson, Rosengren, Suarez, and Willen (2010)
provided empirical assessments of the eectiveness of such measures.
Beginning in March 2009, these lending facilities began to be unwound and replaced by
the gradual purchase of up to $1.1 trillion in mortgage-backed securities, along with $160B in
agency debt and $300B in new holdings of Treasury bonds with greater than one year maturity.
Although rates on MBS and agency debt might be argued to include a default premium, with
the de facto nationalization of Fannie and Freddie, it seems most natural to regard the eect
of these purchases as coming from a change in the relative supply of longer-term assets.2 As
this has become the most important tool going forward, our analysis in this paper focuses on
2Hancock and Passmore (2011) and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) nevertheless found evi-
dence that the MBS purchases did lower the premium on MBS relative to Treasury securities.
9the potential of such operations to alter the term structure of interest rates.
The mechanism by which such asset purchases might have an eect is very dierent from
that characterizing traditional open-market operations. The Federal Reserve is the monopoly
supplier of reserves held by depository institutions and currency held by the public, and
the supply it creates of these assets unquestionably has consequences under normal economic
conditions. However, when the demand for these assets is satiated, it is not clear that anything
the Fed does could aect the pricing kernel determining other yields. While the Fed could
buy longer-term bonds instead of T-bills, Woodford (2010) noted that if the operations have
no aect on the bond's state-contingent income stream or on the state-contingent aggregate
supply of goods available for consumption, they should have no eect on the price of the
bond. Wallace (1981) presented a model in which the maturity composition of government
debt has no eects on any real or nominal variables, and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003)
provided a stronger neutrality result for an economy at the zero lower bound. These neutrality
results arise from the assumption that any changes in the timing of payments made to the
government's creditors would be paid for with nondistortionary changes in taxes, and that any
increase in the private wealth of bond-holders are exactly oset in the sense of Barro (1974)
and Ricardo (1820) by an increase in the liabilities of taxpayers.
And yet, we can clearly observe that government bonds of dierent maturities have dierent
risk characteristics, and these dierences are priced by the market. The government pays
a higher average cost when it borrows long term rather than short term, which would make
no sense to do if the above neutrality conditions actually held. Our interpretation is that a
dierent maturity composition of the government debt does in fact commit the government
10to a dierent time path for spending, distortionary taxes or ination. When it borrows
long, the Treasury is opting to pay a premium for the privilege of passing this risk on to its
creditors rather than absorb it in the form of future contingent changes in spending, taxes,
or ination. Replacing long-term debt with short-term debt then unquestionably has the
potential to exert real eects; see Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005) on the interaction between
distortionary taxation and the potential eectiveness of monetary policy at the zero lower
bound. There is of course also a large empirical literature that has reported a good deal of
evidence inconsistent with the Barro-Ricardian equivalence claim; see for example the survey
in Stanley (1998).
In this paper we suggest an empirical approach to the question of what eects, if any,
changes in the maturity composition of government debt may have on yields. In the next
section we develop a discrete-time version of the framework recently proposed by Vayanos and
Vila (2009). This exercise both claries the mechanism whereby relative debt supplies could
aect the term structure, and also suggests particular empirical measures that we will use in
the subsequent section to summarize the historically observed consequences of changes in the
maturity composition of publicly-held debt.
3 Preferred-habitat investing and market arbitrage.
Vayanos and Vila (2009) proposed that the investors we will refer to as \arbitrageurs" care
only about the mean and variance of rt;t+1; the rate of return between t and t + 1 on their
11total portfolio3:
Et(rt;t+1)   (=2)Vart(rt;t+1): (1)
If y1t denotes the return on a risk-free asset, arbitrageurs will choose portfolio weights such
that for any asset with a risky yield ri;t;t+1,
y1t = Et(ri;t;t+1)   #it (2)
where #it is (1/2) the derivative of total portfolio variance with respect to holdings of asset i:
Consider a pure-discount n-period bond that is free of default risk, the log of whose price
at date t (denoted pnt) is conjectured to be an ane function of a vector of J dierent
macroeconomic factors (denoted ft),
pnt = an + b
0
nft: (3)
The risk-free one-period rate is a function of the same factors,
y1t = a1 + b
0
1ft; (4)
where y1t =  p1t; a1 =  a1; and b1 =  b1. Although these bonds have no default risk, the
future pricing factors ft+s are not known with certainty at date t; and so there is an uncertain
one-period holding yield associated with buying the n-period bond at date t and selling the
3Vayanos and Vila (2009) assumed that arbitrageurs maximize an objective function that is quadratic in
the change in wealth rather than in the rate of return as here. Although their specication may have more
theoretical appeal, their parameterization would be more dicult to bring to the data in the manner we
propose here for an economy in which there is a trend in the level of wealth.










Suppose that the pricing factors follow a VAR(1) process,
ft+1 = c + ft + ut+1 (6)
with ut  i.i.d. N(0;IJ), and that the arbitrageurs hold a fraction znt of their portfolio in the





Then, as we detail in Appendix A, an approximation to the portfolio optimization problem
results in the following implication of (2) for each maturity n:
 a1   b
0
1ft = an 1 + b
0
n 1(c + ft) + (1=2)b
0
n 1











If the number of maturities N is greater than the number of factors J, equation (7) implies
a set of restrictions that bond prices must satisfy as a result of the actions of arbitrageurs,
13who will price factor j risk the same way no matter which bonds it may be reected in.
Vayanos and Vila closed the model by postulating that other credit market participants
may have a particular preference for bonds of a given maturity. They presented examples in
which the borrowing demand from these participants for bonds of maturity n, denoted nt, is
a decreasing ane function of the yield ynt. In our application, we will express these demands
relative to Wt; the net wealth of the arbitrageurs:
nt=Wt = nt   nynt:
Thus nt reects the overall level of preferred-habitat borrowing of bonds of maturity n and
n the sensitivity of this demand to the interest rate. Equilibrium then requires that the net
borrowing by the preferred-habitat sector equals the net lending from the arbitrage sector:
znt = nt   nynt: (10)
Suppose that nt is also an ane function of ft: We show in Appendix B that in equilibrium,
t =  + ft: (11)










Q =     (13)






0bn 1   a1 (14)
c
Q = c   : (15)
4 Estimation of Ane Term Structure Models.
Equations (12) through (15) will be recognized as the no-arbitrage conditions for a standard
ane term structure model (e.g., equations (17) in Ang and Piazzesi, 2003). Thus the
Vayanos-Vila formulation can be viewed as one explanation for the origins of ane prices of
risk. In this section we describe how we estimated parameters for this class of models; for
further details see Appendix C.
Let ynt denote the yield and pnt the log price on an n-period pure discount bond, which
are related by ynt =  n 1pnt: From (3),
ynt = an + b
0
nft (16)
with an =  an=n and bn =  bn=n: In the models we estimate, the factors ft are represented
by a (J 1) vector of observed variables, whose dynamic parameters c and  can be obtained
from OLS estimation of (6). We suppose that we have available a set of M dierent observed
yields Y2t = (yn1;t;yn2;t;:::;ynM;t)0 whose values dier from the theoretical prediction (16) by
measurement error




t  N(0;IM): We assume that the measurement error ue
t is independent of the fac-
15tor innovation ut in (6); but otherwise the structure of e does not aect the estimation
procedure{ full-information maximum-likelihood estimates of all parameters other than e
will be numerically identical regardless of whether the matrix e is assumed to be diagonal.
Our estimates come from the minimum-chi-square estimation algorithm proposed by Hamil-
ton and Wu (2010a) which allows OLS to do the work of maximizing the joint likelihood func-
tion and uses the theoretical model to translate those OLS estimates back into the asset-pricing
parameters of interest. Note that the structure of (6) and (17) implies that OLS equation
by equation is the most ecient procedure for estimation of these reduced-form parameters.
In the special case of a just-identied model (such as that used for our baseline analysis) in
which the number of observed yields M is one more than the number of factors J; there is
an exact solution for the parameters of interest in terms of these OLS coecients, and the
resulting estimates are numerically identical to those that would be obtained by maximization
of the joint likelihood function f(Y2T;fT;Y2;T 1;fT 1;:::;Y21;f1jY20;f0) with respect to the
parameters of the ane term structure model, namely, c;;;cQ;Q;b1;a1 and e:
Among other advantages, this approach allows us to recognize instantly whether estimates
represent a local rather than a global maximum to the likelihood function, and makes it feasible
to calculate small-sample condence intervals for any function of the parameters of interest,
by simulating a thousand dierent samples forfft;Y2tgT
t=1 from a postulated structure and
calculating the estimates that result from the proposed procedure on each separate articial
sample.
165 Data.
Our baseline estimates use weekly observations for ynt; based on constant-maturity Treasury
yields as of Friday or the last business day of the week as reported in the FRED database of
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.4 We supplement this with monthly analysis of holding
yields on securities of nonstandard maturities, for which we construct constant-maturity yields
from the daily term-structure parameterization of G urkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007) as of
the last day of the month.5
We also constructed estimates of the face value of outstanding U.S. Treasury debt at each
weekly maturity as of the end of each month between January 1990 and December 2009 as
detailed in Appendix E. For purposes of the pure theory sketched above, we would want to
interpret each semiannual coupon on a given bond as its own separate zero-coupon security
(paying $C at some time t + s) and construct the market value of the bond as the sum
of the market value of its individual components, each coupon viewed as a separate pure-
discount bond. However, converting the face value into a market value by this device would
be quite unsatisfactory for our larger purpose of identifying exogenous sources of variation in
the supply of outstanding securities at dierent maturities. The true market value of a given
security would be highly endogenous with respect to changes in interest rates, whereas the
4The 30-year yields are unavailable for 2002/2/19 to 2006/2/8. Over this interval we used instead the
20-year rate minus 0.21, which is the amount by which the 20-year rate exceeded the 30-year rate both
immediately before and after the gap.
5Specically, we calculated ynt from their equations (6) and (9) as
ynt = 0t + n 11t1t[1   exp( n=1t)] + 2t1tf1   [1 + (n=1t)]exp( n=1t)g
+3t2tf1   [1 + (n=2t)]exp( n=2t)g
using daily values for the parameters f0t;1t;2t;1t;2tg downloaded from
http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/researchdata.htm.
17face value, by construction, is not.6 Note moreover that, when issued, the face value of the
original coupon bond should be close to the market value of the sum of its individual stripped
components. For these reasons, we regard the face value as reported by the Treasury and
the Fed to be the better measures to use for our purposes, and simply use the number of
remaining weeks to maturity on any given series as the value for n.
We separately constructed rough estimates of how much of the security of each maturity
was held by the Federal Reserve, as detailed in Appendix E. The resulting data structures for
outstanding Treasury debt and Fed holdings take the form of (2401577) matrices, with rows
corresponding to months (ranging from January 31, 1990 to December 31, 2009) and columns
corresponding to maturity in weeks up to 30 years. Figure 3 displays the information from the
December 31, 2006 rows of these two matrices. Figure 4 provides a sense of some of the time-
series variation, plotting the average maturity of debt held by the public for each month.7
Average maturity dropped temporarily in the mid-1990s and began a more signicant and
sustained decrease after 2001. Average maturity dropped sharply between September 2007
and October 2008, but has since reverted back to September 2007 levels.
6Greenwood and Vayanos (2010) dealt with this issue by stripping coupons o and converting from face
value to present value using the historical average short rate.
7The graph plots
PN
n=1 nznt for each t.
186 The term structure of interest rates prior to the -
nancial crisis.
In our baseline specication, we took the J = 3 observed factors to be the deviations from the
sample mean of the level, slope, and curvature of the term structure implied by the 6-month,
2-year, and 10-year Treasuries8, sampled weekly from January 1990 through the end of July,
2007. These yields and the 3 implied factors are plotted in Figure 5. The level factor trended
down over this period, with pronounced dips after the recessions of 1990-91 and 2001. During
these episodes, the term structure also sloped up more than usual and the curvature increased
as the 2-year yield fell away from the 10-year. The parameters c,  and  reported in Table 1
were estimated by OLS regressions of each factor on a constant and lagged values of the other
three factors. We chose M = 4 other yields9 (the 3-month, 1-year, 5-year, and 30-year) in the
vector Y2t in order to estimate the parameters cQ;Q;a1; b1 and e from equation (17). We
8That is, if maturities were measured in weeks, prior to demeaning we would have f1t = (1=3)(y26;t +
y104;t + y520;t); f2t = y520;t   y26;t; and f3t = y520;t   2y104;t + y26;t:
9Note that this approach does not make full use of all the available information, in that we do not impose
any connection between the model-implied value for
y520;t   y26;t = a520   a26 + b0
520ft   b0
26ft
and the observed value of f2t itself. However, the smooth structure of the ATSM causes these restrictions to

























Hamilton and Wu (2010b) showed how to apply the minimum-chi-square algorithm to a system imposing
restrictions such as the above equation directly. The eect of adding this restriction (along with the analogous
expressions for level and curvature) is to x the values of Q and b1 up to the eigenvalues of Q; which
eigenvalues are then estimated from (17). We applied this approach to several of the systems examined below
and obtained almost identical results to those from the simpler approach that ignores these restrictions. To
minimize the computational and expositional burden, we only report here the estimates from the unrestricted
version of the model.
19measured ft in annual percentage points to keep reporting units natural and measured ynt in
weekly discount units so that the asset-pricing recursions all hold as written; for example, a
5.2% continuously compounded annual rate would correspond to f1t = 5:2 and ynt = 0:001:
The model described in Section 3 implies that an objective forecast (sometimes referred to
as the P-measure expectation) of the 3 factors is given by
E
P
t (ft+1) = c + ft:
However, as a result of risk aversion, arbitrageurs value assets the way a risk-neutral investor




t (ft+1) = c
Q + 
Qft:
The risk premium is the dierence between these two forecasts,
E
P
t (ft+1)   E
Q
t (ft+1) =  + ft = t: (18)
We next consider how the term-structure risk factors would be priced according to the
Vayanos-Vila framework under the following special case. Suppose that (1) the preferred-
habitat sector consisted solely of the U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve, (2) the arbitrageurs
comprise the entire private sector, and (3) U.S. Treasury debt is the sole asset held by arbi-
trageurs. These are obviously extreme assumptions, but they have the benet of implying
a clear answer to how changes in the maturity structure of outstanding Treasury debt would
20inuence the price of risk in one highly stylized case. Under these conditions, the arbitrageurs'
portfolio weights znt could be measured directly from the ratio of debt held by the public of
maturity n to the total outstanding publicly held debt at that date. From equations (8) and
(9), we would then predict that t = 0 PN
n=2 zntbn 1: Our empirical results reported






where a value of  = 100 was assumed in order to bring the series roughly on the same scale as
t: This series for qt was calculated with the values bn calculated from equation (12) for Q
and b1 reported in Table 1. The values for the 3 elements of qt are highly correlated, though
as we shall see shortly, there is statistically useful information in the dierence between them.
If the strong assumptions detailed above were literally true, then the vector qt would be
proportional to the corresponding series in (18), and indeed the level, slope, and curvature of
the term structure could be described solely in terms of changes in the maturity composition
of the public debt as summarized by these three factors. Obviously the assumptions do not
hold, and the maturity composition of outstanding Treasury debt is just one of many factors
potentially contributing to interest rate moves. However, it is interesting to look at what
connections there may be in the data between qt and pricing of interest-rate risk. Before
doing so, we emphasize that although the above theory suggests that qt might be related to
the behavior of interest rates, in terms of how the series is constructed mechanically from the
data, the time-series variation in qt is driven solely by changes in the composition of Treasury
debt znt and not at all by changes in interest rates. We accordingly propose the vector qt
as a possible 3-dimensional summary statistic of how the maturity composition of Treasury
21debt changes over time, where the simple theory sketched above suggests that this might be a
summary statistic of interest for purposes of analyzing changes over time in the term structure
of interest rates.
We begin by examining the ability to predict excess holding yields for bonds of dierent
maturities. Let pmt denote the log price of a pure-discount m-month bond purchased on
the last day of month t:10 The k-month holding yield for the bond (quoted at an annual
rate) is (12=k)(pm k;t+k   pmt): This compares with the holding yield for a k-month bond of
(12=k)(p0;t+k  pkt) = (12=k)( pkt): Let hmkt denote the excess holding yield for an m-month
relative to a k-month bond:
hmkt = (12=k)(pm k;t+k   pmt + pkt):
We explored regressions to predict these holding yields on the basis of information available
at date t:




mkxt + umkt: (20)
If investors were risk-neutral, all the coecients in (20) would be zero. Our nding of nonzero
elements for  and  in Table 1 (and a huge literature before us) suggests nonzero values for
cmk and mk, though if the market pricing of risk were fully captured by the 3-factor ane
term structure model, no other variables xt should enter statistically signicantly.11
Table 2 reports the results from OLS estimation of (20), giving the R2 of the regression and
10We inferred these prices from the daily term-structure summaries of G urkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007).
11Although unkt is uncorrelated with the regressors in (20), it is not independent of the regressors, and
thus OLS is subject to the small-sample problems highlighted by Stambaugh (1999). Moreover, given that
risk-neutrality does not hold, both the left-hand and right-hand variables in (20) are highly serially correlated,
raising potential spurious regression concerns if these are near-unit-root processes.
22Newey and West (1987) tests of the hypothesis that mk or subsets of mk are zero for various
specications of xt:12 The rst row reproduces the well-known result that the traditional level,
slope, and curvature factors ft can predict a signicant amount of the excess holding yield
on assets of assorted maturities, with for example an R2 of 0.33 in the case of predicting the
excess returns from holding a 2-year bond for one year. The second row adds the average







which was one of the summary statistics examined by Greenwood and Vayanos (2010),13 but
which we nd in our sample usually does not have statistically signicant additional predictive
power beyond that contained in ft: On the other hand, the other measure they propose, the







does statistically signicantly predict excess returns.
One could consider various other linear combinations of fzntgN
n=1 as possible predictors,
such as the rst three principal components. We nd in the fourth row of Table 2 that these
are helpful for forecasting the holding returns on short-maturity assets, but are generally
12Note that even though the excess holding yield would follow an MA(k 1) process under the null hypothesis
of risk neutrality, one would still need to let the Newey and West (1987) lag parameter go to innity as the
sample size grows in order to get a consistent estimate. The Newey-West approach is helpful under the
alternative hypothesis of a possibly more complex serial correlation, and generates a positive-denite variance-
covariance matrix by construction. We also performed these calculations using Hansen and Hodrick (1980)
standard errors based on k   1 lags. These produced the same results except for one case in which the
Hansen-Hodrick standard error was negative.




The theory sketched above suggests three particular linear combinations of fzntgN
n=1 that
should matter for term premia, namely the three elements of the vector qt in (19). The
sixth row of Table 2 shows that these turn out to be incredibly useful for predicting holding
returns, with an R2 as high as 0.71 in the case of predicting the 2-over-1 excess return. The
contribution of qt is statistically signicant for every maturity, even if the regression already
includes both ft and the rst three principal components of fzntgN
n=1:
Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) proposed a particular yield pricing factor that they have
found very helpful for forecasting excess holding returns. In our application, we conrm that
this factor14 provides a statistically signicant improvement over using just ft alone (row 5 of
Table 2). Nevertheless, our Treasury factors qt still provide a very dramatic improvement in
forecasting ability beyond that contained in ft and the Cochrane-Piazzesi factor vt (row 8).
We next examine the ability of the Treasury factors qt to help predict the yields themselves,
examining OLS regressions of the form
ft+1 = c + ft + qt + "t+1 (23)
for  a (3  3) matrix. The rst column of Table 3 reports that the vector qt makes a useful
contribution to predicting each of the term-structure factors, with the hypothesis that the ith
row of  is zero being rejected for each i.
It is then tempting to use (23) to draw tentative conclusions about what the eects on yields
14In our application, we constructed vt from the tted value of a regression of (1=4)(h24;12;t + h36;12;t +
h48;12;t + h60;12;t) on a constant and the 1- through 5-year forward rates at date t.
24of dierent maturities might be of a change in the composition of publicly held debt. Such
calculations are subject to a well-understood endogeneity problem: historical variations in znt
may have represented a response by the Treasury or the Fed to overall economic conditions
or to term-structure developments in particular. Although this is also a potential concern for
(23), our formulation has three advantages over traditional regressions which simply examine
the contemporaneous correlations. First, any contemporaneous response of qt to ft could not
account for a nonzero value of  in (23). We are explicitly asking about the ability of qt to
forecast future ft+1 over and above any information contained in ft itself.15 Second, because
the statistics we report represent the answer to well-posed forecasting questions, the results
have independent interest as objective summaries of those forecasting relations, regardless of
what the underlying dynamic structural relations may be. Third, because we include lags of
the dependent variable in the regression, we avoid the potential spurious regression problem
that could plague other popular approaches such as trying to use OLS to estimate a relation
of the form ft =  + zA
t :
For purposes of focusing on a particular forecasting question that might be of interest to
policy makers, we consider the following exercise. Suppose that at the end of month t; the
Federal Reserve were to sell all its Treasury securities with maturity less than 1 year, and
use the proceeds to buy up all of the outstanding nominal Treasury debt of maturity greater
than n1t, where n1t would be determined by the size of the Fed's short-term holdings and
outstanding long-term Treasury debt at time t. For example, if implemented in December of
2006, this would result in the Fed selling about $400 B in short-term securities and buying
15On the other hand, if qt only matters for ft+1 through its eect on ft, we might understate the contribution
of qt using our approach.
25about $400 B in long-term securities, eectively retiring all the federal debt of ten-year and
longer maturity. We then calculated what qA
t would be under this counterfactual scenario,
and calculated the average historical value of qA
t   qt; which turns out to be
 =
2











We then asked, by how much would one expect ft+1 to change according to (23) if qt were to
change by ? As should be clear from the description of the exercise, we are talking about a
quite dramatically counterfactual event. If one considers the analogous forecasting equations
of the form qt+1 = cq + qft + qqt + "q;t+1; a change of qt of the size of  would represent
a 36 event, obviously something so far removed from anything that was attempted during
the historical sample as to raise doubts about interpreting the parameter estimates as telling
policy makers what would happen if they literally implemented a change of this size.
The second column of Table 3 reports how a forecast of the traditional term-structure
factors would be aected by this change. We nd that changing qt by this amount could
atten the slope of the yield curve by 25 basis points, with no eect on the level of interest rates
themselves. If it reduces the slope but has no eect on the level, that means it would reduce
long-term yields and raise short-term yields. Indeed, our 3-factor ATSM has a prediction16 as
to how much any given interest rate would change if the factors were to change by the amount
specied in Table 3, which predicted responses we plot as the solid curve in Figure 6. Yields
16The predicted change in ynt is given by b0
n^  for bn =  bn=n; bn calculated from equation (12) using the
values of Q and b1 reported in Table 1, ^  the OLS estimates from equation (23), and  given by (24).
26on maturities longer than 2-1/2 years would fall, with those at the long end decreasing by up
to 17 basis points. Yields on the shortest maturities would increase by almost as much.17
One might wonder whether our Treasury factors qt could be picking up some other fac-
tors relevant for predicting yields that are not captured by the traditional level, slope, and
curvature. As a test for the robustness of our inference, we also estimated the following gen-
eralization of (23), in which vt denotes the Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) yield pricing factors
described in footnote 14:
ft+1 = ~ c + ~ ft + ~ qt + ~  vt + ~ "t+1: (25)
The estimated eects of the Fed swapping all its short-term debt for long-term debt as implied
by the value of ~  in (25) are plotted as the dashed curve in Figure 6. The eects are quite
similar to those estimated in our baseline specication, with short-term yields rising a little
less and long-term yields falling a little more.
There is a potential inconsistency between equation (23) or (25) and the 3-factor speci-
cation (6) that we used to calculate qt in (19) and the smoothed curves in Figure 6. We do
not believe either of these issues are of material importance. If we simply treated the qt as
directly observed factors, equation (23) or (25) would correspond to the rst three equations
of a perfectly well-specied 6- or 7-factor VAR, respectively. Estimation of such equations by
OLS, as we have done, rather than imposing the cross-equation restrictions of the complete
6- or 7-factor ane term structure model has been shown to make little dierence for the
resulting forecasts in other applications (Duee (2011)). And while one could try to solve a
17Our estimates would also allow us in principle to answer dynamic questions, though we are much less
comfortable with using the framework for this purpose. One problem is that the standard errors for dynamic
responses turn out to be quite large. Another challenge is trying to infer the permanent consequences of
changes whose time-series variation has been transitory.
27xed-point problem in which the qt are calculated using the weights of a 6- or 7-factor ATSM
rather than the weights for a 3-factor model as was done here, that would be substantially
more involved technically than the approach we have followed, and we see little benet from
such an eort given that the underlying assumption that Treasury debt is the sole risky asset
held by arbitrageurs is surely not true. Instead we have used the simple 3-factor ATSM as
a tool to assist in identifying which summary statistics of the maturity structure of Treasury
debt might matter for bond prices, and posed as an empirical question what eect these may
have on yields. For this purpose, unrestricted OLS estimation of (23) seems to us to be the
preferred estimation method. As for using the 3-factor ATSM rather than a 6- or 7-factor
ATSM to perform the smoothing in Figure 6, we again think this is a very minor matter.
Three points on the plotted curve (namely, the 6-month, 2-year, and 10-year yields) are es-
timated completely robustly by the argument just made, and the primary role of the ATSM
has been to interpolate between this points. The overwhelming conclusion of researchers in
this area is that a 3-factor ATSM can do a quite good job of summarizing the cross-section
of returns. We would expect little dierence if the interpolations in Figure 6 were instead
performed using a larger dimensional model. Duee (forthcoming) provided formal examples
in which a 3-factor model can exactly summarize the cross-section of yields and yet additional
factors, not spanned by the cross-section of yields, are helpful for forecasting, and argued that
these may be a good approximation to what one nds in the data. Our two-step approach
could be viewed as an example of such a system.
A separate question from the feasibility for the Federal Reserve to achieve these eects on
yields is the desirability of its attempting to do so. Although we have described this as a Fed
28operation, it is probably more natural to think of it as a Treasury operation, implemented by
the Treasury doing more of its borrowing at the shorter end of the yield curve. According
to the simple framework that motivated our denition of qt; the average slope of the yield
curve arises from the preference of the U.S. Treasury for doing much of its borrowing with
longer-term debt. For reasons presumably having to do with management of scal risks, the
Treasury is willing to pay a premium to arbitrageurs for the ability to lock in a long-term
borrowing cost. If the Treasury has good reasons to avoid this kind of interest-rate risk, it is
not clear why the Federal Reserve should want to absorb it.
Our conclusion is that, although it appears to be possible for the Fed to inuence the slope
of the yield curve in normal times through the maturity of the System Open Market Account
holdings, very large operations are necessary to have an appreciable immediate impact. If
there is no concern about a zero-lower-bound constraint, this potential tool should clearly be
secondary to the traditional focus of open-market operations on the short end of the yield
curve.
7 The term structure of interest rates at the zero lower
bound.
The above analysis ended prior to the rst stages of the nancial crisis in August 2007. As
discussed in Section 2, we divide subsequent developments into two phases. The rst phase
was characterized by high default premiums, failures of some leading nancial institutions, and
serious disruption of traditional lending patterns. G urkaynak and Wright (2010) documented
29that under the nancial strains, signicant arbitrage opportunities between yields on dierent
Treasury securities often persisted between October 2008 and February 2009. We will not
attempt to address the many important issues having to do with monetary policy under those
circumstances, but instead begin our analysis here with the second phase which began in
March of 2009, and during which policy makers have confronted the longer-term issue of how
to provide stimulus to aggregate demand when the short-term interest rate had essentially
reached zero.
Figure 7 plots assorted yields over this period. The 3-month yield has remained stuck
near zero over this period, and the 1-year, although higher, has also displayed little variability.
Nonetheless, there has continued to be considerable uctuation in longer-term yields. What
is the nature of the developments driving long-term yields in this environment?
The natural answer is that investors do not believe the U.S. will remain at the zero lower
bound forever. When the U.S. escapes from the ZLB, interest rates at all maturities will
again respond as they always have to changes in economic fundamentals. Any news today
that leads to revisions in the expectations of those future fundamentals shows up as changes
in those longer-term yields.
We propose that one way to interpret current long-term yields is to postulate the existence
of latent factors, denoted ft; which would determine what interest rates would currently be
doing if the ZLB were not binding, along with probabilities that arbitrageurs assign to escaping
from the ZLB at various future dates. For the rst task, what should we assume about the
dynamic behavior of these latent factors? The most parsimonious hypothesis would obviously
be that, when the economy escapes from the ZLB, the factor dynamics would revert to their
30historic behavior as represented by equations like (6) or (23). The dierence is that, when
we originally introduced these equations, we were treating the factors ft as directly observed
from the level, slope, and curvature of the term structure, whereas we are proposing now to
interpret them as latent factors characterizing what the level, slope, and curvature would be
if we were not stuck at the ZLB. For the second task, we again adopt the simplest possible
hypothesis, which is that arbitrageurs assign a constant Q-measure probability Q that the
economy will remain at the ZLB next week.
To develop this idea in more detail, we postulate that, once the economy escapes from the
ZLB, the short rate will return to being determined by the factors according to the structure
~ y1t = a1 + b
0
1ft
~ pnt = an + b
0
nft
where the sequences fan;bngN
n=1 can be calculated as before using the recursions (12) and (14).













If the zero lower bound were interpreted literally, then a
1 would be zero. We represent it
instead with some number slightly above zero to match the U.S. experience in which an interest
rate paid on reserves has prevented the rate from falling all the way to zero.
31Let qn;t+1 denote the holding return on an n-period bond purchased at t and sold at t+1:


















































































































Given cQ;Q;a1;b1; we can calculate fan;bngN
n=1 from (12) and (14). Given these and b

1 = 0;




n=1 as functions of Q and a
1: Predicted bond yields under the ZLB














As a rst pass, we propose to use the same values for cQ;Q;a1;b1; as estimated from the
earlier historical sample. Note that even though these parameters are the same as before, the
implied mapping from factors ft into observed yields has changed. Let Y1t = (y26;t;y104;t;y520;t)0
denote the 6-month, 2-year, and 10-year yields observed at time t. In our historical sample,
these were related to the factors ft according to
Y1t = A1 + B1ft (29)
A1 =
2


























Because we treated the factors in normal times as directly observed from the 6-month, 2-year,
and 10-year level, slope, and curvature, and because of the smoothness of the ATSM term
structure, our estimates were characterized by
B1 
2
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where the approximation would have been exact if we had imposed the restriction that Y1t is
33observed without error.
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:
Let Y2t denote the four other yields used in the estimation, namely the 3-month, 1-year,
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We applied the minimum-chi-square estimation approach developed by Hamilton and Wu
34(2010a) to weekly interest rate data from March 6, 2009 to August 4, 2010 to infer the values
of Q and a
1 from the OLS estimates of ^ A
y
2 and ^ B
y
2; taking cQ;Q;a1;b1; as given by the
pre-2007 parameter estimates, as detailed in Appendix D.
This procedure resulted in estimates 5200^ a
1 = 0:037 and ^ Q = 0:9834; implying that the
ZLB is characterized by a one-week interest rate of 4 basis points (at an annual rate) and
that arbitrageurs expect the ZLB to persist for 1=(1   Q) = 60 weeks. We used these two
parameters along with the pre-crisis values for cQ;Q;a1;b1; reported in Table 1 to calculate
b
n and a
n from (26) and (27), and used these to infer a value for ft on the basis of the
observed 6-month, 2-year, and 10-year yield using (30). With this ft we then have from (31)
predicted values for each week's 3-month, 1-year, 5-year, and 30-year yields, which predictions
are plotted as dashed lines of Figure 7. The R2 for each relation is reported in the rst
column of Table 4. We might compare these with the best possible t as represented by an
unrestricted OLS regression of each yield on a constant and the 6-month, 2-year, and 10-year
yields, whose R2 is reported in the second column of Table 4. Particularly for the longer-term
yields, the predictions from our simple restricted parameterization are not far from what is
actually observed during the ZLB period.
A tougher test of the framework is whether it can successfully predict yields in advance.
Here we used the ft constructed as above, formed the one-week-ahead forecast EP
t (ft+1) =
c+ft again on the basis of the pre-crisis parameters reported in Table 1, and calculated the
implied yields yn;t+1 using (28). Again, particularly for the longer maturities, these forecasts
are reasonably close to the best possible in-sample t as represented by an unrestricted OLS
regression of yn;t+1 on a constant and Y1t (see columns 3 and 4 of Table 4).
35Although the post-sample t is good, the model could nevertheless still be improved.
Hamilton and Wu (2010a) proposed a test of the overidentifying restrictions, which is basically
a test of the statistical signicance of the dierence in R2 between the rst and second columns
of Table 4. This leads to quite strong rejection, with a 2(14) test statistic of 344.5.
We made one further simple adjustment to improve the t further. We postulated that
when the economy escapes from the ZLB, arbitrageurs anticipate a dierent average level of
interest rates (as governed by the parameter a1) compared to that observed in the pre-crisis
episode. The estimated value of 5200a1 is 2.19, meaning arbitrageurs expect the post-ZLB
average short rate to be below the 4.12 level observed over 1990-2007. The new estimate of
5200a
1 is 0.068 and of Q is 0.9907, implying an expected ZLB duration of 108 weeks. These
changes improve the t relative to that of the model summarized in Figure 7 and Table 4,
though the specication would still be rejected (2(13) = 176:0):
Although one could relax other restrictions of the model until a perfect t is achieved,
we regard this as an attractive parsimonious framework that successfully captures the broad
features of how interest rates have been observed to behave under the ZLB regime to date.
Another benet is that this framework gives us an immediate basis for drawing conclusions
about how the eects of monetary policy dier under the ZLB from normal times.
Figure 8 plots the factor loadings, which summarize how the yield of any maturity n is
predicted to respond to changes in any of the three factors. The main dierence is that, under
the ZLB, short-term yields are essentially unresponsive to any macroeconomic developments,
with all three elements of b
n near zero for small n: This is because arbitrageurs see very little
probability of escaping from the ZLB over most of the term of the security. As n increases, the
36response of the yield to macroeconomic factors becomes larger and approaches the response
observed in normal conditions, because there is an increasing probability that the economy
will be away from the ZLB for most of the security's duration.
This framework allows us to revisit the consequences of a shift in the maturity of the
Fed's Treasury holdings. Given our assumption that the latent factors ft are responding in
the same way as they would when away from the ZLB, we can still use the prediction that
a change in the maturity composition of publicly held debt that changes the Treasury risk
factor vector by  would change ft+1 by : But whereas in normal times we premultiplied
this vector by b0
n to see what the change  implied for a yield of maturity n; at the ZLB
we would instead premultiply  by b0
n: These predicted impacts are compared in Figure
9. The policy continues to depress long-term yields by the same amount as in normal times,
but, because of the ZLB, it has very little eect on short-term yields. Cumulative eects on
short-term yields are also negligible, while the ability to bring long yields down is the same
as without the ZLB, as seen in Figure 9.
We have analyzed here the eects of a swap by the Federal Reserve of short-term assets
for longer-term assets. An alternative strategy, which might be characterized as quantitative
easing, is for the Fed to buy longer-term assets outright with newly created reserves. At the
ZLB, interest-bearing reserves are essentially indistinguishable from zero-risk 1-week bonds.
The eect of quantitative easing is to reduce the available supply of longer-term securities
without changing the private-sector's exposure to the risk associated with holding short-term
securities. But at the ZLB, changes in the supply of short-term securities have essentially no
eects. Thus, the economic consequences of quantitative easing would be identical to those
37of the maturity swap just described if the economy were at the ZLB.
8 Discussion.
8.1 Comparison with other estimates.
Here we compare our estimates with those obtained by other researchers. For this purpose,
we standardize on the basis of the two scenarios analyzed above. The rst scenario is a
simultaneous sale by the Fed of $400 B in securities at the short end and purchase of $400 B
in securities at the long end, implemented in December of 2006. The second scenario is an
outright purchase of $400 B in long-term securities, implemented at the zero lower bound.
Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack (2010) used as an explanatory variable the face value
of privately-held debt of more than one-year maturity as a percent of GDP, and as dependent
variable the 10-year yield or 10-year term premium. They estimated the eect of debt
supply on yields using regressions estimated 1986:M12 to 2008:M6 that included several other
explanatory variables, and obtained a coecient relating the 10-year yield to bond supply of
0.069. Since $400 B would represent about 2.9% of U.S. GDP in 2006:Q4, their estimates
imply a predicted decline in the 10-year yield under scenario 1 of (2.9)(0.069) = 20 basis
points. This is close to our estimate of a decline of 14 basis points, as reported in the rst
row of Table 5.18
18Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack (2010)'s regressions in which the term premium rather than the
yield is the left-hand variable would imply estimates as low as 12 basis points. However, these are harder to
compare directly with those for our scenario. In our conception of the question being asked, we assume that
the supply of securities with maturity less than one year increases by $400 B, driving up the yield on those
securities and making the decrease in the term premium larger than the decrease in the yield. This eect is
not captured by the Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack (2010) regressions.
38In the analysis of Greenwood and Vayanos (2010), the right-hand variable was the fraction
of privately-held debt with duration greater than 10 years, and the left-hand variable was
assorted yield spreads. They found that a one-percentage-point increase in the share resulted
in a 4-basis-point increase in the 5-year-1-year spread over the period 1952-2006. In the sample
we studied (1990-2007), a maturity swap of the size contemplated in scenario 1 would have
lowered the share of debt with maturity greater than 10 years by 9.8 percentage points. This
gives an eect implied by the Greenwood-Vayanos estimates of (9.8)(4) = 39 basis points. For
comparison, our estimate of the size of the eect is 17 basis points for scenario 1, but only 9
basis points for scenario 2. The reason for the dierence between the two scenarios is that,
in our framework, part of the drop in the spread if the policy had been implemented over
the period studied by Greenwood and Vayanos (2010) would have come from an increase in
short-term yields, something that would not happen if the same purchase were implemented
at the zero lower bound.
Another recent analysis comes from D'Amico and King (2010), who looked at the change
in yields of dierent maturities during the Fed's purchase of $300 billion in long-term securities
between March and October of 2009. They concluded that these purchases lowered the yield on
10-year Treasuries by about 50 basis points, which would translate into an eect of (4/3)(50)
= 67 basis points for the $400 B purchase analyzed in Table 5, a somewhat larger eect
than implied by our estimates. However, the 10-year yield was where these purchases were
concentrated and where D'Amico and King found the biggest eects, and large standard errors
are associated with any of these estimates.
Deutsche Bank (2010) attempted to synthesize the estimates of Gagnon, Raskin, Remache,
39and Sack (2010), Macroeconomic Advisers, and their own research sta, and estimated that $1
trillion in long-term purchases in the current setting might produce a 50-basis-point decline
in long-term yields, which we've translated as a 20-basis-point decline for the $400 billion
purchase reported in Table 5.
In 1961, the U.S. attempted to use Treasury and Fed operations to lower the fraction of
publicly-held long-term debt in what was referred to as \Operation Twist." Swanson (2011)
used a daily event study of announcements pertaining to the Operation Twist and found
eects on bond yields that, when scaled by the change in size of outstanding Treasury debt,
are broadly consistent with those summarized in our Table 5.
Although our estimates of the eects are the smallest in this group, they are generally in
the same ballpark, which is somewhat surprising given the very dierent ways in which these
estimates are derived. There is overall agreement that suciently large asset purchases could
achieve a modest reduction in long-term yields. There is nevertheless considerable uncertainty,
both in terms of the econometric standard errors and possible specication errors, in any of
the estimates reported.
8.2 Eects on non-Treasury securities.
Here we sketch a generalization of the theoretical framework in Section 3 to allow arbitrageurs
also to hold other securities with a nonzero probability of default.
40Let P
z







1 with probability exp(  t)
0 with probability 1   exp(  t)
:
If the arbitrageurs hold a fraction z
z
1t in the risky asset and if the probability of default  t
is independent of risk factors ft; then using a similar approach to that in Appendix A, the
contribution of the risky asset to the variance can be approximated19 by z
z2
1t t and the no-
arbitrage condition (2) becomes
y
z
1t = y1t +  t(1 + z
z
1t): (34)
In the absence of risk aversion ( = 0); in equilibrium the risky security will oer the same
expected return as the risk-free security, which requires a premium of  t to compensate for
the probability of default. With risk aversion ( > 0) and a positive exposure of arbitrageurs
to this risk (z
z
1t > 0); the risky asset will oer a higher expected return to compensate for the
risk.
If the factors that govern  t and determine equilibrium z
z
1t are independent of the factors
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41ft that determine the risk-free yield, the one-period risky rate would have identical loadings
as y1t on uctuations in the level, slope, and curvature factors, as well as additional loadings
on separate default-risk factors. A parallel result can be derived for risky assets of longer
maturity, with p
z
nt loading on ft with the same coecients bn as for risk-free bonds, along with
separate loadings on the default-risk factors.
Although the independence of Treasury and default risk factors is a highly stylized as-
sumption, there is no question that risky yields of dierent maturities respond in a similar
way to the factors driving Treasury yields. Figure 10 displays the comovement between the
10-year Treasury rate and that on 30-year mortgages and Aaa-rated and Baa-rated corporate
debt20.
Rather than impose a particular loading of non-Treasury yields on the level, slope, and







j ft + ut
over t = 1990:M1 to 2007:M7 for assorted securities j: Note that if there is a correlation
between the default risk factors and ft; this will be incorporated in the estimated values
of b
z
j: Table 6 reports the empirical factor loadings for these three risky yields, which, not
surprisingly given Figure 10, turn out to be similar to those for 10-year Treasury bonds.
In the next-to-last column we use these estimated values of b
z
j to calculate the predicted
eect in normal times of a shift in the maturity composition of Fed holdings.21 Based on
20Aaa and Baa yield represent values as of the last day of the month, while the 30-year mortgage rate is for
the last week of the month, from the FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
21These were calculated as b
z0
j  for  the matrix of OLS coecients in (23) and  given by (24).
42the historical correlations between bond yields, in the pre-crisis period, if the Fed were to sell
$400 billion of short-term Treasuries and buy $400 billion in long-term Treasuries, the 10-year
T-bond and the Aaa and Baa corporate yields would each be expected to decline by 14 basis
points, and the 30-year xed mortgage rate by 11 basis points.
We can also get a quick impression of what might be expected at the zero lower bound as
follows. The predicted change in the 6-month, 2-year, and 10-year yields of this $400 billion








1 ); then we get a predicted eect
on y
z





1: These estimates are reported in the last column of Table
6. Interestingly, buying long-term Treasuries might if anything have an even bigger eect on
risky yields when at the ZLB than it does in normal circumstances. Again, at the ZLB, in
our framework the eects are the same whether the Fed nances the purchases with sales of
short-term T-bills or with newly created reserves.
If the Fed were instead to purchase risky securities directly, the resulting reduction in
arbitrageurs' holdings of these securities z
z
nt would both reduce the default risk premium
(through equation (34)) as well as aect the pricing of Treasury level, slope or curvature risk
(because by holding these risky securities an investor is also exposed to the conventional term
structure factors). For example, the Fed's MBS purchases could both atten the slope of the
Treasury yield curve and narrow the spread between MBS and Treasury yields.
We should also comment on how arbitrageurs' holding of risky securities would inuence our
empirical estimates of the matrix  itself. If Treasuries represent only a subset of arbitrageurs'
holdings, then Treasury holdings as a fraction of their total wealth znt would be a smaller
43number than we have assumed. If, for example, each znt were divided by 2, our vector qt
and therefore the magnitude  would be divided by two, while the OLS estimates ^  would
be multiplied by two. Notice that a change in scale of this type would leave the estimated
product  unchanged and have no eect on any of the estimates reported. This invariance
results from the fact that ultimately our estimates are simply an empirical summary of the
historical relations between observed yields and maturity shares znt dened as a percentage of
total publicly held federal debt, and it is the historical covariation of yields with outstanding
Treasury debt that determined these estimates. If we were trying to make an inference about
structural coecients such as the risk aversion parameter ; getting the scale right would be
important. But for the purposes for which the estimates are used here, the scale of znt does
not matter for any of the reported results.
8.3 Application: Evaluation of QE2.
On November 3, 2010, the Federal Reserve announced its intention to implement additional
measures to stimulate the economy, which was described in the nancial press as a second
round of quantitative easing (QE2). The plan was to purchase an additional $600 billion of
longer-term Treasury securities by the end of the second quarter of 2011, a pace of about $75
billion per month. This diered in several details from the scenarios analyzed above.
The rst dierence is that, as implemented, the purchases were concentrated not on the
longest-maturity securities, but instead focused primarily on securities between 2-1/2 and 10
years. Over the period 1990-2006, if the Fed had sold all its holdings of less than 1 year and
used the proceeds to purchase outstanding Treasury debt evenly over the 2-1/2 to 10 year




Whereas the estimated eects of  on the term structure are statistically signicantly distin-
guishable from zero in our framework, those resulting from 2 are not. Figure 11 compares
the estimated eects on yields of  and 2 if implemented at the zero lower bound. The
dashed curve summarizes the predicted eects if the Fed were to sell all its holdings of less
than 1-year maturity, and use the proceeds to retire debt of the longest outstanding matu-
rities. Note this is identical to the dashed curve in Figure 9. The solid curve summarizes
the predicted eects if the Fed were to sell all its holdings of less than 1-year maturity, and
spread the proceeds evenly to purchase outstanding Treasury debt in the 2-1/2 to 10 year
range. The latter has a signicantly smaller eect on long-term rates. Again we interpret
an outright purchase of a comparable quantity of securities as having similar eects to a debt
swap when the economy is at the zero lower bound.
A second important dierence between QE2 as it's been implemented by the Fed and the
scenarios analyzed here is in the timing, with the purchases associated with QE2 spread over
a period of 8 months. Between November 2009 and November 2010, non-TIPS Treasury
debt increased by $127.3 billion per month, of which $71.4 billion was in the 2-1/2 to 10 year
maturity range. Hence, the proposed QE2 would barely absorb the newly issued medium-
term debt, and debt of greater than 10 years would continue to increase rather than decline.
The top panel of Figure 12 shows that the average maturity of publicly-held Treasury debt
has been higher in each of the rst three months of QE2 than it had been in any month over
45the preceding 2 years. The bottom panel shows that the fraction of publicly-held debt of
more than 10 years maturity continued to increase even as the Fed was implementing its QE2
bond purchases. Our conclusion is that QE2 as implemented had little potential to lower
long-term interest rates via the mechanism explored in this paper.
9 Conclusion.
We have found statistically signicant forecasting relations over 1990-2007 between the ma-
turity structure of Treasury debt held by the public and the behavior of U.S. interest rates.
These relations suggest that in normal times, the Federal Reserve has some potential to atten
the yield curve, though not to reduce the overall level of interest rates, by selling short-term
securities and buying long-term securities. Our estimates of the eect on impact suggest that
quite massive operations would be necessary to have a measurable eect on interest rates.
We proposed that altering the maturity structure of publicly held Treasury debt would be
equally eective at lowering long-term yields when the economy is at the zero lower bound.
But because there are negligible consequences for short-term yields in such a setting, the
policy of reducing public holdings of long-term bonds has the potential to bring the overall
level of interest rates down for an economy at the ZLB, whereas it could not do so in a normal
environment. Quantitative easing, dened as buying the long-term bonds with newly created
reserves, has the identical potential in this model.
One might suppose that the potential small magnitude of the eect is not a concern as far as
the latter policy is concerned{ if hundreds of billions are not enough to make much dierence,
46then perhaps purchases in the trillions, such as the Fed has embarked upon with its holdings
of mortgage-backed securities, might do the trick. However, we would emphasize that, in
the model of the ZLB proposed here, the entire ability to inuence long-term yields comes
from investors' perceptions of what fundamentals are going to be after normal conditions have
returned. A policy that only kept the supplies o the market during the ZLB episode itself
would have much more limited potential. In this sense, this particular form of nonstandard
monetary policy could end up having limited eectiveness for the same reasons as policies that
hope to inuence the public's expectation of what the target will be for short-term interest
rates once the economy escapes from the ZLB.
Our estimated eects are linear{ twice as big a purchase is predicted to have twice as big
an eect on yields. But this is simply an assumption of our empirical estimation strategy and
not a proposition we have tested directly in the data. Particularly since the magnitudes under
discussion are so dierent from the observed historical variations from which our estimates
were inferred, extrapolation of these eects to larger and larger policy measures is of necessity
an uncertain exercise.
We also noted that, although we have framed the discussion here in terms of options
available to the Federal Reserve, this policy tool could naturally be implemented by the
Treasury itself altering the term structure of debt that it issues. If the Treasury has sound
reasons not to do so, it is unclear why the Federal Reserve should try to undo the Treasury's
attempted hedging of the unied government's balance sheet with respect to interest rate risk.
Conversely, if the Fed has good reasons to try to atten the slope of the yield curve, it is
unclear why the Treasury should resist being the agent to implement the plan.
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52Appendix A. Details of the arbitrageurs' portfolio optimization prob-
lem.
Let Pnt denote the price of a pure-discount n-period bond (with P0t = 1), Wt the total wealth
of the arbitrageurs, and znt the portion of their wealth allocated to each bond maturity. Then






















53If the change in prices between t and t+1 is small,22 the portfolio's mean return and variance
can be approximated









n 1(c + ft) + (1=2)b
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where the (J 1) vector dt summarizes exposures to each of the J factor risks associated with
holding the (N  1) vector of bonds zt. The arbitrageurs thus choose zt so as to maximize
(1) subject to (36), (37), (9), and
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where ("1;t+1;:::;"N;t+1)0  N(0;
): Our approximation is derived from the limiting behavior as h becomes
small, analogous to those obtained when considering a continuous-time representation of a discrete-time pro-






















nn the row n; column n element of 
 and zt = (z1t;:::;zNt)0: Equations (36) and (37) are obtained by
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54Appendix B. Arbitrage-free equilibrium.
Note that ynt =  n 1pnt =  n 1(an +b
0
nft) and suppose that nt = n +#0
nft: If we multiply
































Appendix C. ATSM estimation for a just-identied model.
We rst estimate the parameters of (6) and (17) by OLS:
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(ft   ^ c   ^ ft 1)(ft   ^ c   ^ ft 1)
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(Y2t   ^ A   ^ Bft)(Y2t   ^ A   ^ Bft)
0:


















for i = 1;:::;M:
For the just-identied case with M = J + 1; we solve this [(J + 1)  J] system of equations
for the J(J +1) unknowns Q and b1 using numerical search. Taking these values for Q and
b1 as given, we can then use (12) to solve for bn for any desired n along with













The J + 1 values for a1 and cQ are then found by numerical solution of the J + 1 equations
^ Ai =  n
 1
i ani for i = 1;:::;M:
Appendix D. ATSM estimation for an overidentied model.






































56for which the inverse of the usual variance matrix for the estimated coecients is given by
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The minimum-chi-square estimation procedure proposed by Hamilton and Wu (2010) esti-
mates the structural parameters of interest  = (Q;a
1)0 or (Q;a
1;a1)0 by minimizing
T[^    g()]
0 ^ R[^    g()] (38)








and g() denotes the corresponding predicted value from (33).
Under the null hypothesis that the model is correctly specied, the minimal value achieved
for (38) should have an asymptotic 2(k1   k0) distribution, where k1 = 14 is the number of
parameters in ^ A
y
2 and ^ B
y
2 and k0 = 2 or 3 is the number of elements in .
Appendix E. Details of data construction.
Following Greenwood and Vayanos (2010), we started with CRSP data for outstanding Trea-
sury debt by individual CUSIP number to estimate outstanding nominal Treasury debt at
the end of each month. We calculated n for each issue by calculating the number of days
57between maturity and the last Friday of the month, and converted to weeks by rounding up.
The raw source for these data appears to be the Monthly Statement of the Public Debt of the
United States. We checked these data by summing all the maturities and comparing this sum
with the sum of nominal bills, bonds, and notes recorded in the Haver database,23 which also
comes from the same Monthly Statement. We found numerous discrepancies, which came
from such factors as the CRSP les on occasion missing individual CUSIP series and at other
times having incorporated assorted data entry errors. We were able to correct CRSP data
errors so as to reduce almost all discrepancies to less than $200 M by hand comparison of the
CRSP numbers with individual copies of the Monthly Statement itself.
Although the Federal Reserve currently reports outright Treasury holdings for the System
Open Market Account by individual CUSIP, we were unable to secure access to historical
archives of these, and settled for rough estimates constructed as follows. The Federal Reserve's
weekly H41 release24 reports SOMA each Wednesday by rough maturity breakdowns (less than
15 days, 16-90 days, 91 days to 1 year, over 1 year to 5 years, over 5 years to 10 years, and over
10 years), and we matched up the last Wednesday of each month for SOMA holdings with the
last calendar day of the month for Treasury marketable debt. Unfortunately, the reported
SOMA maturity categories include both nominal Treasuries as well as TIPS, which we exclude
from our analysis. Our solution was to assume that Fed holdings of TIPS as a fraction of the
Fed's total holdings of notes and bonds was the same across all maturity categories. Total
Fed holdings of notes and bonds are reported on the H41, as are total TIPS holdings (though
23We thank Christiane Baumeister for sharing these Haver data.
24Available in Table 2 of http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=H41. Prior
to June 2003, we used the end-of-calendar month data compiled by Kuttner (2006) available at
http://econ.williams.edu/people/knk1/research.
58prior to December 2002, we had to read the latter by hand from the notes section of individual
reports). We then multiplied each maturity category greater than 1 year by this ratio to get
an estimate of total TIPS holdings in those categories. For maturity categories less than 1
year, we multiplied by the product of this ratio with the ratio of the Fed's notes and bonds of
maturity less than 1 year to the Fed's total Treasury securities less than one year. We then
subtracted the resulting estimates of TIPS holdings within each maturity category from the
reported total holdings within each category to get our estimate of nominal Fed holdings for
each maturity category. We then allocated this ratio evenly across total outstanding Treasury
securities of each weekly maturity falling within that category to arrive at our estimate of how
much of those securities were held by the Federal Reserve's SOMA.
59Tables
Table 1: Parameter estimates for the weekly ane term structure model









































































a1  5200 4:1158
(0:0074)





























0 0 0 0:1171
(0:0028)
Estimated Jan 5, 1990 to July 27, 2007. Small-sample standard errors in parentheses. Sample size:
T = 917. Bold indicates statistically signicantly dierent from zero at the 5% signicance level.
Variable denitions: c;; and  are the intercept, AR coecients, and square root of variance for
the VAR for factors (equation (6));  and  are the intercept and factor loadings for the price of
risk (equation (11)); cQ and Q are the risk-adjusted intercept and AR coecients (equations (15)
and (13)); a1 and b1 are the intercept and factor loading for the short-term interest rate (equation
(4)); e is the square root of the variance matrix for the measurement error (equation (17)).
60Table 2: Holding-return forecasting regressions
Regressors 6m over 3m 1yr over 6m 2y over 1y 5y over 1y 10y over 1y
c;f
t 0:357 0:356 0:331 0:295 0:331
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
c;ft;zA
t 0:410 0:420 0:373 0:300 0:336
(0:020) (0:119) (0:311) (0:728) (0:665)
c;ft;zL
t 0:428 0:501 0:524 0:398 0:357
(0:003) (0:008) (0:006) (0:035) (0:196)
c;ft;z
pc
t 0:368 0:361 0:333 0:297 0:334
(0:001) (0:007) (0:062) (0:098) (0:051)
c;ft;v
t 0:385 0:409 0:388 0:339 0:338
(0:016) (0:001) (0:006) (0:008) (0:227)
c;ft;q
t 0:444 0:568 0:714 0:617 0:549




t 0:452 0:571 0:717 0:618 0:550
(0:002) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:002)
c;ft;vt;q
t 0:458 0:595 0:737 0:640 0:552




t 0:476 0:597 0:741 0:670 0:634
(0:000) (0:001) (0:000) (0:002) (0:054)
R2 and hypothesis tests for holding-return forecasting regressions. Reported numbers are the R2
for the regressions, with p-values in parentheses, for tests of the null hypothesis that coecients on
starred variables are zero. All regressions also include a constant term and all hypothesis tests use
Newey-West variance matrix with 20 lags. Bold indicates coecients on starred variables are
statistically signicantly dierent from zero at the 5% signicance level. Variable denitions: c is
the constant term in the regression; ft is a (31) vector consisting of the level, slope, and curvature
at time t as calculated in footnote 8; zA
t is the average maturity of outstanding debt (equation (21));
zL
t is the fraction of outstanding debt of 10-year maturity or longer (equation (22)); zPC
t is a vector
consisting of the rst 3 principal components of fz1t;:::;zNtg; vt is the Cochrane-Piazzesi factor
described in foonote 14; qt is the (3  1) vector of Treasury risk factors dened in equation (19).









Granger-causality tests and scenario impact estimates for factor vector autoregression. First
column reports F test (p-value in parentheses) of null hypothesis that i = 0 in regression
fit = ci + 0
ift 1 + 0
iqt 1 + "it for fit the ith factor described in footnote 8. Second column reports
estimate of 0
i for that regression (with standard error) for  the average change in q under the
alternative scenario (equation (24)).
Table 4: R2 for post-crisis sample
Contemporaneous Forecast
restricted unrestricted restricted unrestricted
3m 0.625 0.668 0.522 0.602
1y 0.891 0.924 0.652 0.767
5y 0.961 0.975 0.753 0.753
30y 0.965 0.972 0.735 0.787
R2 for post-crisis sample (March 3, 2009 to Aug 10, 2010) for unrestricted regression of indicated
yield on current or lagged yields and R2 for regression in which coecients are restricted to be
pre-crisis weights adjusted as in equation (26). Contemporaneous: prediction of ynt given current
6-month, 2-year and 10-year yields. Forecast: predictions of ynt given lagged 6-month, 2-year and
10-year yields.
62Table 5: Comparison of dierent estimates
Original estimates Hamilton-Wu estimates
Study Measure Pre-crisis ZLB Pre-crisis ZLB
Gagnon, et. al. 10 yr yield -20 -14 -13
Greenwood-Vayanos 5yr-1yr spread -39 -17 -9
20yr-1yr spread -74 -25 -18
D'Amico-King 10yr yield -67 -14 -13
Deutsche Bank 10yr yield -20 -14 -13
Comparison of dierent estimates of the eect of replacing $400 billion in long-term debt with
short-term debt.
Table 6: Risky securities
Yield Factor loadings Normal ZLB
level slope curvature eect eect
10-year Treasury 1.000 0.500 0.167 -14 -13
Aaa Corporate 0.883 0.453 0.379 -14 -15
Baa Corporate 0.888 0.441 0.535 -14 -17
30-year Mortgage 0.933 0.363 0.325 -11 -13
Empirical loadings of selected yields on Treasury level, slope and curvature factors, and predicted
eect on yield (in basis points) of selling $400 billion in short-term Treasury debt and buying $400
billion in long-term Treasury debt.
63Figures
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Top panel: 5-year break-even ination rate, calculated as nominal yield of 5-year Treasury bond
minus nominal yield on 5-year Treasury Ination Protected Security, 2005:M1-2010:M6. Data
source: FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Bottom panel: 5-year expected
CPI ination, from the average response of the Survey of Professional Forecasters, 2005:Q3 to
2010:Q2. Data source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
























Federal Reserve assets, in billions of dollars, Jan 3, 2007 to Aug 4, 2010, Wednesday values,
seasonally unadjusted, from Federal Reserve H41 release. Maiden 1: net portfolio holdings of
Maiden Lane LLC; MMIFL: net portfolio holdings of LLCs funded through the Money Market
Investor Funding Facility; TALF: loans extended through Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan
Facility; AIG: sum of credit extended to American International Group, Inc. plus net portfolio
holdings of Maiden Lane II and III; ABCP: loans extended to Asset-Backed Commercial Paper
Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility; PDCF: loans extended to primary dealer and other
broker-dealer credit; discount: sum of primary credit, secondary credit, and seasonal credit; swaps:
central bank liquidity swaps; CPLF: net portfolio holdings of LLCs funded through the Commercial
Paper Funding Facility; TAC: term auction credit; RP: repurchase agreements; MBS:
mortgage-backed securities held outright; agency: federal agency debt securities held outright; misc:
sum of oat, gold stock, special drawing rights certicate account, and Treasury currency
outstanding; other FR: Other Federal Reserve assets; treasuries: U.S. Treasury securities held
outright.
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Maturity structure of U.S. federal debt as of December 31, 2006. Horizontal axis: maturity in
weeks. Black bars: face value of marketable nominal Treasury securities of that maturity, in
millions of dollars. Light bars: imputed holdings of the System Open Market Account of the U.S.
Federal Reserve.
66Figure 4: Average maturity










Average maturity in weeks of debt held by the public, plotted monthly from Jan 31, 1990 to Jan
31, 2011.
67Figure 5: Yields and factors
Yields































Yields and factors used in baseline estimation, weekly from Jan 5, 1990 to July 27, 2007.
68Figure 6: Impact on yields of lengthening maturity of Fed holdings














Solid curve: predicted change in yn;t+1 (quoted in annual percentage points) as a function of weeks
to maturity n in response to shift in qt of size  using the baseline specication. Calculated from
5200b0
n^  as in footnote 16. Dashed curve: predicted change from specication in which
Cochrane-Piazzesi yield factors are also included (calculated as 5200b0
n~  with ~  the estimate from
equation (25)).
69Figure 7: Actual and model tted interest rates












Actual (solid) and predicted (dashed) behavior of selected interest rates, weekly from March 7,
2009 to August 10, 2010. Rates shown (in order from top to bottom) are the 30 year, 5 year, 1
year, and 3 month.
70Figure 8: Factor loadings














Solid curves: normal loadings (plots of 5200bn as function of maturity n in weeks). Dashed curves:
zero-lower-bound loadings (5200b
n). Top panel: level loadings; middle panel: slope loadings;
bottom panel: curvature loadings.
71Figure 9: Impact of lengthening maturity of Fed holdings in normal times and at the ZLB









Predicted change in yn;t+1 (quoted in annual percentage points) as a function of weeks to maturity
n in response to shift in qt of size . Solid: eect in normal times (plot of 5200b0
n as a function
of n); dashed: eect at the zero lower bound (plot of 5200b0
n).
72Figure 10: Assorted long-term yields













30−Year Fixed Rate Mortgage
AAA
10 year Treasury
Assorted long-term yields, 1990:M1 to 2007:M7.
73Figure 11: Eects of two dierent maturity swaps














Eects of two dierent maturity swaps when implemented at the zero lower bound. Dashed curve:
Fed sells all its holdings of less than 1-year maturity and retires debt at the longest end of the
maturity structure (plot of 5200b0
n as a function of n). Solid curve: Fed sells all its holdings of
less than 1-year maturity and retire debt evenly across 2-1/2 to 10 year maturities (plot of
5200b0
n2).
74Figure 12: Eects of QE2 on maturity structure
Average maturity of publicly-held Treasury debt











Long-term publicly-held Treasury debt as a percent of total publicly-held Treasury debt









Top panel: average maturity of Treasury debt other than that held by the Federal Reserve (zA
t ),
2010:M1-2011:M1. Bottom panel: fraction of outstanding Treasury debt not held by the Federal
Reserve that is of 10 years or longer maturity (zL
t ), 2010:M1-2011:M1.
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